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I. Introduction
One could argue that no right is held more dearly in our society
than the freedom of speech that our First Amendment provides.
Our courts have afforded speech the greatest deference, and have
analyzed with the greatest scrutiny laws and claims attempting to
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curtail that right. 1 We as a nation have done this because we
believe that robust conversations on these issues form the
backbone of a functioning democracy. 2 This has resulted in a vast
and storied line of cases where our highest court has repeatedly
protected the right to speak freely. 3 Particularly, the Supreme
Court has stressed that journalistic publications’ speech should be
afforded the greatest deference because of its contribution to
society. 4 In doing so, the Court has frequently maintained that
statutes seeking to restrict speech and claims seeking to hold those
publications liable for speech are invalid. 5 The Court has held that
public figures bringing claims against publications will be subject
to an even higher standard. 6 Across decades of cases and among
1. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725 (1971) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (opining that the government cannot prevent a newspaper from
publishing a story simply on conjecture that inconvenience or inappropriateness
may result); see also Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976)
(promulgating a court order preventing the reporting of a polarizing murder trial
unconstitutional because the heavy burden to secure prior restraint on freedom
to speak and publish had not been met); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (finding unconstitutional a statute that criminalized crossburning because it sought to regulate the content of speech).
2. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (explaining that one of
the undisputed goals of the First Amendment is the “free discussion of
governmental affairs”).
3. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that
the First Amendment did not permit imposing a restraint on publishing the
“Pentagon Papers” when it was unclear whether publishing would “surely result
in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people”); see
also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) (striking down a statute that
required veterans to make a loyalty pledge to the government because it
effectively penalized not engaging in a particular type of speech).
4. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 (1964) (describing the
importance of First Amendment protections to society); see also N.Y. Times Co.,
403 U.S. at 719 (explaining the paramount role that free speech and free press
has in safeguarding the American people).
5. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 722–23 (1931) (finding
unconstitutional a state law allowing prior restraint); see also Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1964) (overturning a Louisiana law that punished
true statements made with “actual malice”).
6. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (requiring a public official to reach a higher
threshold for establishing a defamation claim); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (declining to deny First Amendment protections
to speech that is clearly offensive and intended to inflict emotional injury when
the speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating true facts about
a public figure).
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tort claims ranging from libel to infliction of emotional distress, the
Court has repeatedly defended the media’s ability to publish free
from fear of civil liability. 7 To do otherwise would chill the free
exchange of ideas and expressions that these publications
contribute so strongly towards. 8 In fact, it was a reaction to the
restrictions put upon publications through licensing agreements
by Great Britain that contributed to the codification of our First
Amendment. 9 This tradition shows that the decision in Bollea v.
Gawker 10 is objectively wrong. It is without precedent and violates
the very nature of our constitution. In fact it directly contradicts
precedent set in this particular area of law. 11 It features a
publication that published truthful facts about a public figure that
had held himself out as a role model for children. 12 For the
publicized facts the publication was found liable for damages
exceeding $100 million, which led to its bankruptcy and auctioning
of its assets. 13 Under no circumstance is this result just, in line
7. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (invalidating civil penalties for a libel claim
against a newspaper because otherwise it would chill free speech); see also
Falwell, 485 U.S. at 108 (describing how imposing strict liability on a publisher
for false facts would have a chilling effect on speech relating to public figures).
8. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 281–82 (indicating that the courts must protect
First Amendment rights to criticize public officials, lest a chilling effect develop
over the criticism of public officials).
9. See generally HIS MAJESTY’S STATIONARY OFFICE, ACTS AND ORDINANCES
OF THE INTERREGNUM 1642–60, 184–86 (C.H. Firth & R.S. Rai eds. 1911)
(authorizing the search, seizure, and destruction of materials offensive to the
government).
10. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1204 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2014) (holding that the “circuit court’s order granting Mr. Bollea’s motion
for temporary injunction is reversed because it acts as an unconstitutional prior
restraint under the First Amendment”).
11. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., No. CV 98-0583 DDP (CWx), 1998
WL 882848, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1998) (granting summary judgment for
defendants in a publication of private facts because showing short clips of a
celebrity sex tape constituted newsworthy content); see also Haynes v. Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1234 (7th Cir. 1993) (granting summary judgment for
defendants in a publication of private facts because publishing the facts of the
plaintiff’s private “bedroom” life served a legitimate public interest).
12. See generally Eve Vawter, Hulk Hogan’s Apology Can Never Bring His
Role Model Status Back, CAFEMOM (July 24, 2015), http://thestir.cafemom.com/
parenting_news/188369/hulk_hogans_apology_can_never (describing Hulk
Hogan’s status as a role model in the 1980s) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
13. See Sydney Ember, Gawker, Filing for Bankruptcy After Hulk Hogan
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with precedent, or commensurate with public policy. Without
freedom of speech, all other constitutionally protected rights may
be undermined. This is about protecting the free press, which in
turn protects the populace by informing them of the truth so that
they can make judgments for themselves. After all, an informed
populace is essential to a functioning democracy. As Thomas
Jefferson wrote “[o]ur liberty depends on the freedom of the press,
and that cannot be limited without being lost.” 14
II. Background
A. The Tape
In the mid-2000s, Terry Bollea (Bollea) was visiting with his
friend, Bubba the Love Sponge (Bubba), and Bubba’s wife, Heather
Clem (Clem). 15 Bubba convinced Bollea to engage in sexual
activities with Clem. 16 Bollea and Clem then proceeded to enter a
bedroom where Bubba filmed their sexual encounter. 17 Bollea’s
awareness of the camera is disputed, but the tape lay inert for
several years. 18 In 2012, the film disappeared from Bubba’s home;
it is unknown who took the tape and how the tape was removed
from the home. 19 The tape eventually made its way to the offices of
Suit, Is for Sale, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com
/2016/06/11/business/media/gawker-bankruptcy-sale.html?mcubz=1 (reporting
Gawker’s filing for bankruptcy following its suit with Bollea) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
14. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 12 VOLS. 503
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).
15. See Nick Madigan, Hulk Hogan Takes Stand in His Sex-Tape Lawsuit
Against Gawker, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/08/
business/media/hulk-hogan-sex-tape-gawker-lawsuit.html?mcubz=1 (establishing
the background facts of the Bollea-Gawker suit) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
16. See id. (regretting now that Bubba had convinced Bollea to engage in
sexual activities with Clem).
17. See id. (“In his testimony, Mr. Bollea said he had been stunned to learn
that the man he considered his best friend, who acknowledged having an ‘open
marriage,’ might have used a camera installed in the bedroom to record the sexual
encounter.”).
18. See id. (indicating that Bollea was unaware that a camera was recording
the encounter).
19. See id. (suggesting the uncertainty as to how the tape was removed from
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Gawker Media, LLC (Gawker), which released a short segment of
the recording on their website with a corresponding article. 20
B. The Trial
Following the release of the tape, Bollea initiated a suit in
federal court for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and copyright infringement. 21 He asked the
court for a temporary injunction to prevent the publication of the
recording. 22 The court summarily denied the temporary
injunction. 23 Following his loss in the Middle District of Florida,
Bollea voluntarily dismissed his claim and brought a new claim in
the state courts of Florida. 24 The new claim was essentially
identical to the one previously brought in federal court. 25 The state
appellate court similarly thwarted his attempts at another
preliminary injunction by reversing the circuit court’s decision. 26
The state appellate court criticized the state circuit court’s
understanding of privacy rights of public figures, noting
the home and who actually recorded the tape).
20. See id. (“Mr. Bollea, who will continue testifying on Tuesday, openly
discussed the video at issue in an appearance on a television show run by the
website . . . .”).
21. See Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327 (M.D. Fla.
2012) (addressing Bollea’s claims of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon
seclusion, publication of private facts, violation of the Florida common law right
of publicity, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
22. See id. (discussing that, to prevent his own irreparable harm, Bollea
asked for a preliminary injunction to remove published excerpts of the video and
to enjoin further publication of the video).
23. See id. at 1331 (“Plaintiff has introduced no evidence establishing that
he would suffer irreparable harm . . . absent injunctive relief . . . . [A]ny violation
is best redressed after a trial on the merits rather than by a prior restraint in
derogation of the First Amendment.”).
24. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2014) (explaining that on the same day that Bollea voluntarily dismissed his
claim in federal court he instituted a claim in the state circuit court).
25. See id. (indicating that the claim brought in state court was “essentially
the same” as the claim brought in federal court).
26. See id. at 1204 (concluding that the state circuit court’s granting of the
preliminary injunction was invalid as an “unconstitutional prior restraint on
speech under the First Amendment”).
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particularly that Bollea had opened his private life up to the public
through his wrestling celebrity status and his starring in a reality
television program centered around his life and family. 27 The court
concluded that the interests of the First Amendment far
outweighed the value of the injunction. 28
In March 2016, the trial finally began in the state courts of
Florida. 29 After two weeks of testimony and argument, the court
tasked the jury with reaching a decision. 30 The jury returned with
a verdict in favor of Bollea, awarding him $140.1 million in
damages. 31 The unravelling of Gawker thus began. Following the
massive jury award, both Gawker and its Chief Executive Officer
Nick Denton filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 32
Univision subsequently acquired Gawker’s assets in the August
2016 auction that followed. 33 After the sale, both parties reached a
settlement for $31 million. 34 But, the damage was done: civil
27. See id. at 1200 (establishing that Bollea meets the very definition of a
public figure, and explaining that, as compared to private individuals, the privacy
concerns of public figures often warrant a different standard of First Amendment
protections).
28. See id. at 1204 (concluding that the temporary injunction violated the
First Amendment as a prior restraint on speech).
29. See Yanan Wang, ‘Whatcha Gonna Do Gawker?’ Trials Begins on Hulk
Hogan’s $100 Million Sex Tape Suit Against Gawker Media, WASH. POST (Mar. 2,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/03/02/whatchagonna-do-gawker-trial-to-begin-on-hulk-hogans-sex-tapes/?utm_term=.8ff49eb425ef
(noting that this would be the first ever celebrity sex tape case to make it to trial)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
30. See Tamara Lush, A Jury Sided with Ex-Pro Wrestler Hulk Hogan on
Friday and Awarded Him $115 Million in his Sex Tape Lawsuit Against Gawker
Media, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/
entertainment/articles/2016-03-18/closing-arguments-expected-in-hogan-gawkertrial (describing the Bollea-Gawker trial) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
31. See Les Neuhaus, Total Damages in Hulk Hogan Sex Tape Case: $140.1
Million, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-hulkhogan-20160321-story.html (detailing the aftermath of the Bollea-Gawker suit)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
32. Ember, supra note 13.
33. See Sydney Ember, Gawker and Hulk Hogan Reach $31 Million
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/
business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan-settlement. html?mcubz=1 (reporting on the
settlement reached between the parties) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
34. See id. (“Gawker capitulated, settling with Hulk Hogan, whose real name
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liability destroyed the publication. 35 Liability had been imposed
not for slander, libel, or defamation, but for the publication of
truths. 36 It signaled to some that Florida’s media laws had
returned to the despotic ways of our persecuted forbearers. 37 It is
clear that this decision is not in line with precedent, public policy,
or our nation’s goal of a free exchange of ideas.
C. The History of Hulk Hogan
One key factor that makes this case so divergent from
precedent is that Bollea is a public figure. 38 In order to fully
understand Bollea’s role as a public figure, a brief history of his
public career within the wrestling industry is required. Bollea
began his wrestling career in Florida in the mid-1970s. 39 Wrestling
at that time was not as open as it is today; in fact, it functioned
more as a closed business, similar to that of the mafia. 40 Each
region of the country was broken into several “territories,” with
each territory typically controlled by a single promoter or a
is Terry G. Bollea, for $31 million, according to court documents, and bringing to
a close a multiyear dispute that stripped the company of much that once defined
it.”).
35. See id. (indicating that the large award granted to Bollea forced Gawker
into a bankruptcy auction).
36. See Neuhaus, supra note 31 (explaining that Bollea’s claim was based on
the publication of a truthful video and not for inaccurate or libelous speech).
37. See Michael McCann, Hogan Lawsuit vs. Gawker Could have Massive
Impact on Journalism, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 26, 2016), https://www.si.com/
more-sports/2016/05/26/hulk-hogan-gawker-lawsuit-litigation-finance-journalism
(recognizing that the decision in Gawker presents troubling ramifications for the
field of journalism as a whole) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
38. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2014) (establishing Bollea’s undisputed status as a public figure).
39. See SCOTT M. BEEKMAN, RINGSIDE: A HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL
WRESTLING IN AMERICA 120 (2006) (presenting a history of professional wrestling
in the United States).
40. See id. at 84–85 (explaining how the territories banded together and
colluded to protect the NWA Championship title); see also Graham Flanagan, The
Epic Story of How Vince McMahon Created WWE and Conquered Pro Wrestling,
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/vince-mcmahonwwe-wrestling-territories-wcw-ted-turner-2016-11 (explaining the nature of the
business of professional wrestling before McMahon purchased WWF from his
father) (on file with Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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syndicate of promoters. 41 These territories were virtual monopolies
in their respective areas and a territory’s respective promoter
protected its value. 42 Given the closed-off nature of this industry,
it is unsurprising that Bollea experienced some difficulty in his
introduction. During his first training session with Hiro Matsuda
(Matsuda), a legendary Japanese shoot wrestler, 43 Bollea suffered
a broken leg. 44 The business was so protected at that point that one
would have to suffer an injury and return to show commitment to
the sport and a willingness to protect its dirty secret. Although it
is now known that professional wrestling is predetermined, that
veil was first lifted publicly in 1989 by World Wrestling
Entertainment’s (WWE) Vince K. McMahon (McMahon). 45
McMahon admitted to the predetermined nature of the sport to
evade taxes associated with state athletic commissions. 46 But,
when Bollea began his professional wrestling career, the mystery
of ”kayfabe” still veiled the sport. 47 “Kayfabe” is the concept of
predetermined events being portrayed as legitimate sporting
events. 48 This is represented in the wrestling industry in many
41. See BEEKMAN, supra note 39, at 118 (explaining the closed-off, territorial
nature of professional wrestling pre-WWE expansion).
42. See id. at 118 (indicating that the “sanctity” of each promoter’s territory
lay in their understanding that other promoters would not encroach on their
territory).
43. See id. at 39 (describing “shoot” wrestlers as professional wrestlers who
have real fighting skills).
44. See James Montgomery, Hulk Hogan on ‘Tough Enough’ and How Kevin
Owens Made Him a Believer, ROLLING STONE (June 23, 2015),
http://www.rollingstone.com/sports/features/hulk-hogan-on-tough-enough-andhow-kevin-owens-made-him-a-believer-20150623 (expanding on the significant
developments in wrestling training that have occurred since Hulk Hogan entered
the business) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); see also X-Wrestling Online, Hulk Hogan Talks About Hiro Matsuda
Breaking His Leg, YOUTUBE (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=L294k7N3NM0 (providing Bollea’s own recounting of the Matsuda training
incident) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
45. See BEEKMAN, supra note 39, at 131 (describing McMahon’s tactics in
protecting the growing commercialization of his wrestling empire).
46. See id. at 131 (conceding that professional wrestling did not represent
legitimate athletic competition).
47. See id. (explaining that many promotions viewed McMahon’s revelation
to be the death knell of the business).
48. See id. at 40 (stating that “kayfabe” generally held up until the 1980s).
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ways, but none is more telling than the motto of many wrestlers at
the time: “keep kayfabe.” 49 To “keep kayfabe” is to keep the public
in the dark as to the true nature of the sport. 50 The intense
devotion to this credo partially results from the tremendous
damage done to the sport following scandals that resulted in
several Department of Justice investigations in the 1950s. 51 The
damage led to the sport’s fall from national prominence as it
continued to lose ground to football and baseball in television
markets across the country. 52
The popularity of wrestling would again rise to national
prominence. The catalyst behind this return was the combination
of two men: McMahon and Bollea. Following his recovery from his
broken leg, Bollea returned to Matsuda to finish his training and
begin his career in the Florida wrestling territories. 53 After
achieving some success in the Florida territories, the demand from
other promoters for Bollea began to increase. 54 Bollea was in a very
advantageous position in that he was young, handsome, and
gigantic. As a “blonde former bodybuilder,” he was the complete
package that these promoters were looking for. 55 His first exposure
to McMahon took place in 1980, when McMahon’s father, Vincent
J. McMahon (the promoter of the north east territory at the time)
brought him in to work at Madison Square Garden (their
promotions main hub). 56 Over time, Bollea’s character, better
known as Hulk Hogan, began to fully develop. 57 He was given the
Hulk moniker following a joint radio interview where both he and
49. See id. (reporting that “kayfabe” endured as long as it did despite
exposés, defections, and governmental investigations).
50. See id. (tracing the “carnivalesque” roots of keeping business secrets from
paying customers).
51. See id. at 98–99 (describing the DOJ investigations into cutthroat,
monopolistic business practices aimed at independent promoters).
52. See id. at 93 (explaining the rise of baseball and football as a consequence
of the advent of television).
53. See id. at 120 (noting Bollea’s early career in Florida).
54. See id. (describing Bollea’s progressive rise in the industry).
55. See id. (explaining that Bollea was McMahon’s most “important
acquisition”).
56. See id. at 120 (detailing Bollea’s first encounter with Vincent K.
McMahon).
57. See generally HULK HOGAN & MARK DAGOSTINO, MY LIFE OUTSIDE THE
RING (2009).
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Lou Ferrigno (Ferrigno), the star of the Incredible Hulk at the
time, had been present. 58 The host had remarked that Bollea was
substantially larger than Ferrigno, and the “Hulkster” was born. 59
As his popularity increased internationally, Bollea was eventually
brought into another one of the large American territories in
Minnesota, the American Wrestling Association (AWA). 60 Bollea
did not return to New York because he had a falling out with
Vincent J. McMahon over Bollea’s desire to play a role in the film
Rocky III. 61 Vincent J. McMahon did not want Bollea to perform
the role and their professional relationship ended. 62 The role
proved to increase Bollea’s popularity in Minnesota and beyond,
giving the wrestler his first exposure in the mainstream. 63 He
became one of the most popular and well compensated professional
wrestlers in the history of the sport. 64 However, his success,
popularity, and wealth were only in its infancy, for he was yet to
combine his efforts fully with McMahon. This combination would
lead to wrestling reaching its greatest heights in popularity,
profitability, and publicity.
To understand what happens next in the story, you have to
understand a little about the structure of professional wrestling in
the country in the early 1980s. As stated above, the industry was
divided into regional territories with each functioning as a minimonopoly in its small region. 65 Some of these territories were very
58. See id. at 76–77 (“One day, I went on a local talk show and wound up
sitting on-air right next to Lou Ferrigno.”).
59. See id. (“[S]itting next to me at that point in my life, the guy looked kinda
[sic.] small. That blew Jerry Jarrett away. I got back to the dressing room after
the show and Jarrett was like, ‘Good God, Terry! You were sitting on TV and you
were bigger than the Hulk!’”).
60. BEEKMAN, supra note 39, at 131.
61. See Silver Screen Artists, HULK HOGAN in Rocky III . . . What Did It
Do for Hogan’s Career?, SILVER SCREEN ARTISTS, http://silverscreenartists.com/
hulk-hogan-in-rocky-3-what-did-it-do-for-hogans-career/ (last visited Dec. 1,
2017) (explaining that Bollea was fired from the WWF following his role in Rocky
III) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Justice).
62. See id. (“After filming his scene for Rocky III against the wishes of Vince
McMahon Sr., then-owner of WWF, Hulk Hogan was mysteriously ostracized by
the organization shortly after the big screen appearance.”).
63. See BEEKMAN, supra note 39, at 131 (explaining how Bollea steadily
increased his popularity through the role in Rocky III).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 118.
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small, sometimes only existing in the metro area surrounding a
major city. 66 One such example included Houston Wrestling, run
by Paul Bosch in the 1970s and 1980s. 67 Houston Wrestling would
run wrestling shows in and around the city of Houston. 68 Their
shows ranged in size and prestige from small shows in high school
gyms to huge blockbuster shows in the Sam Houston Coliseum. 69
Along with running those shows, each territory would typically
have a television program whose purpose was to promote the live
shows held each week. 70 Essentially the television program would
serve as a commercial for the promotion’s weekly shows while also
providing some advertising revenue to the promotion from the
television station. 71 Larger territories, such as the AWA and WWE,
while having much larger geographic footprints than organizations
like Houston Wrestling, typically respected the television rights of
the smaller organizations. 72 WWE and AWA traditionally only sold
their television programs to networks within their geographical
region (the Northeast and Midwest respectively). 73 This all
changed when McMahon took over the WWE from his father. 74
McMahon had a strategy to take wrestling national again and
return it to its historical prominence. 75 Bollea, as Hulk Hogan, was
essential to this plan. 76 The plan had several elements. First
McMahon would begin by attempting to acquire the most popular

66. Id. at 110 (indicating that some territories consisted of a single metro
area such as Dallas or Kansas City).
67. See generally Ken Hoffman, Glory Day of Paul Boesch’s ‘Houston
Wrestling’ Now Online, HOUS. CHRON. (July 17, 2015), http://www.houston
chronicle.com/life/columnists/Hoffman/article/Glory-days-of-Paul-Boesch-sHouston-Wrestling-6391434.php (describing author’s visits to Houston Wrestling
and his experiences watching the events) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See BEEKMAN, supra note 39, at 131 (describing the relationship between
larger and smaller territories in the national wrestling industry).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 119.
75. Id.
76. Id.

226

24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 215 (2017)

wrestlers from around the country. 77 These wrestlers were the
current stars of the regional territories and were directly
responsible for bringing in the audiences the smaller promotions
required to maintain profitability. 78 McMahon also contacted local
television affiliates and made them an offer they could not refuse:
McMahon offered to pay the affiliates to air his programs in the
time slots occupied by regional promotional shows that the
affiliates were currently paying for. 79 Thereby the affiliates were
turning an expense into an additional revenue stream. By doing
this he stymied his competitors’ revenue generation in two ways:
by signing their stars he diminished their live event revenue and
by taking their television contracts he prevented ad revenue from
reaching the promotions. 80 The national rollout that would follow
would completely transform the industry from one based on small
regional promotions to that of national juggernauts competing for
national attention. 81 McMahon was not without competitors in his
venture. Two of the other larger regional promotions also
attempted to go national: Crocket Promotions (Crocket) out of
North Carolina and Virginia and AWA out of Minnesota. 82 Neither
organization was able to compete, which led to the closure of AWA
and the sale of Crocket to Turner Broadcasting (which was
rebranded as World Championship Wrestling (WCW) and went on
to compete with WWE successfully for nearly two decades before
suffering a similar fate to other promotions and being forced to sell
to WWE). 83
The creation of superstar that could captivate the country was
central to McMahon’s plan. No man better fit that description at
the time than Bollea as Hulk Hogan. Hulk Hogan was portrayed
as good guy. 84 This is important because wrestlers are typically
77. Id. at 121.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 121–22 (discussing that through this strategy, McMahon was
able to pick “off promoters one by one”).
81. See id. at 121–24 (explaining the consolidation of promotions that was
occurring at that time).
82. Id. at 122.
83. Id. at 129–30.
84. Id. at 123.
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portrayed as either babyfaces (heroes) or heels (villains). 85
Promoters effectuate this distinction by portraying the characters
in different lights and the characters’ actions. 86 Hulk Hogan was
portrayed as the ultimate babyface, an American hero who
explained to his followers (the Hulkamaniancs) that if one “eats
their vitamins and says their prayers” they will grow up to be as
big and strong as the Hulk. 87 Because of the “kayfabe” nature of
the business, this was portrayed to be Bollea nature in real life. 88
As the centerpiece of McMahon’s plan to dominate the world of
wrestling, Bollea was depicted as beating challenger after
challenger. 89 Because of his victories he served as a role model to
a generation and became a household name around the world. 90
Bollea would go on to parlay the celebrity status he achieved as a
role model in the WWE into many movie and television deals
including: No Holds Barred, Mr. Nanny, and Eponymous Hogan
Knows Best, among many others. 91

85. See Torch Glossary of Insider Terms, PRO WRESTLING TORCH (2008),
https://www.pwtorch.com/insiderglossary.shtml (providing the definitions for
various wrestling terms) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
86. See Kaizar Cantu, Realism in Pro Wrestling: A Change of Heart, or the
Babyface-Heel Dilemma, BLEACHER REP. (Dec. 17, 2011), http://bleacherreport.
com/articles/987346-realism-in-pro-wrestling-a-change-of-heart-or-the-babyfaceheel-dilemma (“Through actions, technique and color schemes in ring attire, the
average pro wrestling fan can define heel and face roles in a particular match
from the very start.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
87. BEEKMAN, supra note 39, at 131.
88. See Frank Pallotta, Hulk Hogan on How Wrestling’s ‘Kayfabe’ Went Big
Time,
CNN,
http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/07/media/hulk-hogan-wrestlingtestimony-gawker-trial/index.html (discussing how wrestlers stayed in character
outside of the ring in front of fans) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Justice).
89. See id. (describing Bollea’s WWE character).
90. See Vawter, supra note 12 (explaining that Hulk Hogan fame was so
great that he was the celebrity most often requested by the Make-a-Wish
Foundation).
91. See Hulk Hogan, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001356/ (last
visited Dec. 4, 2017) (detailing a biography about Bollea and providing his
filmography) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
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D. The Tort

Bollea’s role as a voluntary public figure and role model for
children is important to this particular case because the actions of
public figures are more likely to be found newsworthy. The
invasion of privacy tort is an invention of the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries. 92 The concept developed following Louis
Brandies and Samuel Warren’s article entitled The Right to
Privacy. 93 Their argument for a tort based on an invasion of
privacy has slowly entered the legal field over the past 130 years. 94
The invasion of privacy tort comes in several flavors each
governing different modes that the invasion could take. 95 The
Bollea case was brought under invasion of privacy by publication
of private facts. 96 One who “gives publicity to a matter concerning
the private life of another is subject to liability if the matter
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person and (b) is not of a legitimate public concern.” 97
The tort implicates fundamental First Amendment issues and
therefore has presented difficulties to plaintiff actions. 98
Publication of private facts contains three essential elements.
The first requirement is that the fact be publicized—it must be
disclosed to a third party in some manner. 99 Second, the tort
requires identification—the plaintiff must be identified in the
disclosure to the third party. 100 The third and final element of the
92. BRUCE M. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY, 11–12 (2d ed. Supp. 2015).
93. See id. (explaining that tort finds its origin in the law review article and
that it has developed over time).
94. See id. (explaining that the tort has evolved over time with the
development of technology and new mediums for news transmission).
95. See id. (indicating that there are “four judicially recognized types of
invasion of privacy—intrusion, publication of private facts, false light and
appropriation”).
96. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2014) (indicating that a portion of Bollea’s claim against Gawker was for
invasion of privacy by publication of private facts).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
98. See 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION 12–36 (3d ed. Supp. 2009)
(explaining that some states have not adopted the tort and others have questioned
its constitutionality).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 12–42.
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tort requires that the facts disclosed to the third party be private
in nature. 101 The tort also requires that the private facts not
concern a matter of public concern. 102 This provision serves more
as a defense to the tort than as an element and is frequently what
prevents plaintiffs from collecting damages. 103 It becomes an even
more pertinent defense and higher hurdle for plaintiffs to
overcome when the plaintiff is a public figure. 104 Courts have
allowed almost all truthful statements about public figures to fall
into the newsworthiness exception. 105 It has been nearly
impossible for public figures to recover monetary damages from
publications based on the publication of private facts tort because
of the newsworthy exception. 106
III. Argument
Bollea is a public figure. 107 He has been enriched by his fame
and gained public goodwill as a role model for children. 108 Being a
celebrity does have some downsides that one must endure along
with its benefits. One of those downsides is that your actions and
inactions suddenly become matters of public concern. 109 There is
additional interest when the public figure occupies a special place
101. See id. at 12–34 (indicating that the facts disclosed must be both private
“as a matter of fact and as a matter of law”).
102. See id. at 12–47 (explaining that newsworthiness could be more
generally understood to mean of “general interest” to the public).
103. See id. (explaining that the newsworthiness exception provides “broad
protection for publication of what otherwise appear to be embarrassing private
matters”).
104. See id. at 12–49 (explaining that the lives of public officials and public
figures are generally “subject to the greatest scrutiny”).
105. See id. (indicating because of the public’s general interest in the lives of
public figures few statements about their private lives have been found to not fall
in the newsworthiness exception).
106. See id. at 12–53 n.225 (listing the many times public figures have failed
to succeed with the claim).
107. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2014) (explaining that it was undisputed that Bollea was a public figure).
108. Vawter, supra note 12.
109. See generally Rawlins v. Hutchinson Pub. Co., 218 Kan. 295 (1975)
(explaining that both public figures’ and officials’ actions are a matter of public
concern).
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in society as role models do, particularly role models of children. 110
The public has a compelling interest in being able to learn if the
public figure acts the same in their private lives as they claim to
in their public lives. 111 Because of that, Bollea’s actions were of
public concern and fit squarely in the newsworthy exception. It
would be highly likely that a parent would be interested in
knowing if their children’s role model was involved in an
adulterous affair with his purported best friend’s wife.
As mentioned above, invasion of privacy by publication of
private facts is an incredibly difficult tort from which to derive
recovery. 112 There are a number of reasons for why plaintiffs find
recovery so difficult. The tort creates numerous First Amendment
issues just from its existence. 113 To lessen the torts impingement
on the First Amendment, the courts through the common law have
Newsworthiness
created
the
newsworthy
exception. 114
traditionally carries several definitions. It has been “defined
broadly to include not only matters of public policy, but any matter
of public concern, including the accomplishments, everyday lives,
and romantic involvements of famous people.” 115 The plaintiff has
the burden of proving that the information revealed was not
newsworthy. 116
While there is no precedent that is based off facts identical to
those of the Bollea and Gawker case, there are many others that
have similar themes. Those cases almost always have ended with
verdicts protecting the rights of publishers to broadcast, either in
print or video, those truthful facts. 117 From television producers
110. See id. at 298–300 (applying that reasoning to a police officer).
111. See generally id.
112. See SACK, supra note 98, at 12–53 n.225 (listing the many times public
figures have failed to succeed with the claim).
113. See Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 691 (Ind. 1997) (stating that
“Indiana Constitution commands real caution about proposals to recognize a civil
cause of action for libel that impose liability for truthful statements”).
114. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp. Inc., 1998 WL 882848, at *7 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) (indicating that the purpose of the “newsworthy privilege” is to protect
the “First Amendment freedom to report on matters of public concern”).
115. Id.
116. See id. (stating “plaintiff has the burden of proof to demonstrate that the
matters publicized are not newsworthy, or that the depth of intrusion in private
matters was ‘in great disproportion to their relevance’ to”).
117. See SACK, supra note 98, at 12–53 n.225 (noting the general trend of cases
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who showed clips of a celebrity sex tape on a news program, 118 to a
former child prodigy whose privacy was invaded and had
unflattering facts published about him in an article, 119 to a man’s
public outing in an article after he helped prevent the
assassination of the President of the United States, 120 every time
a media publisher and her authors’ rights to publish truthful
private facts have been upheld. 121 In each one of these cases, and
many more we will examine, the publisher’s right to publish has
been defended by the privilege attached to reporting truthfully on
newsworthy events. The threshold for the newsworthiness
privilege is not particularly high, and it should have protected the
Gawker organization, its editors, and its journalists.
IV. The Genesis of the Tort and the Precedent
A. Application of the Tort to the Old Media
Privacy law is a relatively new invention of the twentieth
century and therefore there is limited precedent from which to
draw upon. 122 From its inception, courts have attempted to balance
the both the personal interest of the plaintiff in privacy with the
public interest of dissemination of newsworthy information. 123
California’s first blush, but certainly not its last, with invasion of
that deal with publishers’ rights to broadcast).
118. See Michaels, 1998 WL 882848, at *1 (explaining the facts of the case
where clips of a celebrity plaintiff’s sex tape were shown on a news program and
held to be newsworthy).
119. See Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 807 (2d Cir. 1940) (explaining
the facts of the case where a reclusive former child prodigy was made the subject
of a publicly embarrassing article and cartoon despite his wishes to the contrary).
120. See Sipple v. Chron. Pub. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(describing the facts of the case where a homosexual man had his sexual
orientation revealed in an article against his wishes following his help in
preventing the assassination of President Gerald Ford).
121. See Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807 (dismissing claim of former child prodigy); see
id. at 1043–44 (upholding dismissal of claim brought by an involuntary public
figure whose sexual orientation had been revealed).
122. See SANFORD, supra note 92, at 11–22 (explaining that privacy law is a
relatively new field).
123. See Sidis, 113 F.2d 806 at 809 (attempting to balance the privacy interest
of individuals with the press’s right to publish newsworthy stories).
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privacy law occurred in 1931 with the production and release of the
film The Red Kimono. 124 Before reforming her life, the plaintiff,
Gabrielle Melvin (Melvin), had been a prostitute. 125 During her
time as a prostitute she had been accused and later acquitted of
murder. 126 Sometime after the criminal trial, Melvin reformed her
life and married, living in the words of the court an “exemplary,
virtuous, honorable, and righteous life.” 127 The film depicted her
earlier life while using the plaintiff’s maiden name for the role of
the title character. 128 The plaintiff then claimed that the
publication of these earlier facts about her life caused her great
hardship through loss of reputation and abandonment by her
friends when they recognized her name from the film. 129 The court
first had to determine whether California would recognize an
invasion of privacy claim; after determining that it would, it then
found for the plaintiff. 130 The court explained their decision by
stating that no moral or ethical code would permit or justify the
publication of these facts about the private life of Melvin. 131 Here,
we see the genesis for the newsworthy exception in California. The
court explains that if the film only contained facts from the murder
trial that Melvin was acquitted of, it would have been immune to
the invasion of privacy suit. 132 By including details concerning
Melvin’s life that were outside of the public record, the producers
had crossed over into a forbidden territory and invaded the privacy
124. See Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 287, 291–92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931)
(explaining the facts of the case where a woman’s life was depicted in an
unflattering film titled The Red Kimono).
125. See id. (explaining that the plaintiff’s former occupation was a source of
embarrassment for the plaintiff).
126. See id. at 286 (“It is alleged that appellant's maiden name was Gabrielle
Darley; that a number of years ago she was a prostitute and was tried for murder,
the trial resulting in her acquittal.”).
127. Id.
128. See id. (explaining that it was easy to discern for those in plaintiff’s
community that she was the subject of the film).
129. See id. at 291–92 (indicating that plaintiff has suffered numerous harms
in her community from the film’s revelations about her past).
130. See id. at 292 (articulating that the invasion of privacy by the defendants
was not justified by any standard of “morals or ethics”).
131. See id. (indicating that the court could find no policy justification for
using the name of the plaintiff in the film).
132. See id. at 291 (noting that the facts of the trial were a matter of public
record and thereby implying that they are of a matter of public concern).
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of Melvin. 133 While not termed by the court at the time, one can
easily interpret this decision to read that the defendants were
being punished for publishing facts that were not of a public
concern. If they had limited themselves simply to facts that were
of public concern, the privacy suit would have failed. As we will
see, a similar formulation for the yet unnamed newsworthy
exception will be developed in several states over the decades
following Melvin’s victory.
When the courts of New York approached the same problem,
they came to a different result, but used a similar methodology. 134
The New York court was interpreting a recently passed statute
that would allow suit for use of the likeness of an individual “for
trade purposes.” 135 The court found that there was no violation of
the statute because it did “not contemplate the publication of a
newspaper, magazine, or book which imparts truthful news or
other factual information to the public.” 136 The court would also go
on to explain their thoughts on the invasion of privacy tort itself,
responding to the article written by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis some fifty-five years earlier. 137 The court stated:
[W]e are not yet disposed to afford to all of the intimate details
of private life an absolute immunity from the prying of the
press. Everyone will agree that at some point the public interest
in obtaining information becomes dominant over the
individual’s desire for privacy. Warren and Brandeis were
willing to lift the veil somewhat in the case of public officers. We
would go further, though we are not yet prepared to say how
far. At least we would permit limited scrutiny of the ‘private’

133. See id. (explaining that the court’s decision lies in the fact that the
defendant’s publicized facts about the plaintiff that were not included in the trial).
134. See Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940) (“But despite
eminent opinion to the contrary, we are not yet disposed to afford to all of the
intimate details of private life an absolute immunity from the prying of the
press.”).
135. See id. at 810 (explaining that because a common cause of action for
invasion for privacy had not yet been accepted by New York, the plaintiff’s claim
would have to come under the statute).
136. Id.
137. See id. at 809 (indicating that the court’s belief over what would
constitute an invasion of privacy is different from the on proposed in Warren and
Brandies’ article The Right to Privacy).
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life of any person who has achieved, or has had thrust upon him,
the questionable and indefinable status of a “public figure.” 138

Herein lies the genesis of the newsworthy exception. Although not
yet named as such, the court clearly contemplated that if the
private facts publicized are of interest to the public at large, the
interest of the public outweighs the privacy interest of the
individual. 139 The court expands the interpretation of Warren and
Brandies to not just public officials, but also to those whose lives
are of interest to the public: “public figure[s]”. 140 William James
Siddis, a former child prodigy of mathematics, was a public figure
for the purposes of the court’s interpretation of an invasion of
privacy tort. 141 The court goes on to note that the article contained
a “considerable popular news interest” that would qualify for
newsworthiness. 142 Probably because the court was in fairly
uncharted territory, it cautioned its earlier statements with a
disclaimer:
We express no comment on whether or not the news worthiness
of the matter printed will always constitute a complete defense.
Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of
the victim’s position as to outrage the community’s notions of
decency . . . . Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of
neighbors and ‘public figures’ are subjects of considerable
interest and discussion to the rest of the population. And when
such are the mores of the community, it would be unwise for a
court to bar their expression in the newspapers, books, and
magazines of the day. 143

This cautionary statement served as an early bound to the
liberality the newsworthiness exception was granted. The
exception would continue over the rest of the twentieth century to
138. Id.
139. See id. at 809 (explaining the delicate balance between the right of the
public and the private person’s right to privacy while also contemplating the
different privacy rights of private persons and public figures).
140. See id. (stating that the court believes information of interest to the
public about those individuals that have become public figures is newsworthy).
141. See id. (explaining briefly the nature of Sidis’ celebrity and his unusual
and reclusive life that had made him the subject of the article).
142. See id. (describing that a former child prodigy’s status was newsworthy
because it was the result of radical parenting methods that were publicized and
the validity of those methods was newsworthy).
143. Id.
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be expanded and further fleshed out, with boundaries and limits
tested through litigation. The now charted boundaries of the
exception should have shielded the publishers of Gawker from
liability stemming from the publication of the Bollea tape.
The Supreme Court approached this question in 1975 with its
decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn. 144 The publication at
issue in Cox was the dissemination of the identity of a deceased
rape victim by a reporter. 145 The Court fully understood the gravity
of its decision and the two prime interests that were at stake,
stating:
Because the gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication
of information, whether true or not, the dissemination of which
is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an individual, it is here
that claims of privacy most directly confront the constitutional
freedoms of speech and press. The face-off is apparent, and the
appellants urge upon us the broad holding that the press may
not be made criminally or civilly liable for publishing
information that is neither false nor misleading but absolutely
accurate, however damaging it may be to reputation or
individual sensibilities. 146

The perpetual balancing act that our First Amendment requires
had again reared its ugly head and required the Court to determine
if journalists could be punished for publishing true facts. 147 The
Court held that because those facts were publicly available, there
was no invasion of privacy. 148 Nonetheless, in addition to this
decision, the Court indicated that a privilege exists for journalist

144. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (holding that
“the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press to
liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public in official
court records”).
145. See id. at 471–73 (stating the background of the case, that the reporter
had learned the identity of the victim from court documents that were in public
record).
146. Id. at 489.
147. See id. at 471–74 (“[W]hether, consistently with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, a State may extend a cause of action for damages for invasion of
privacy caused by the publication of the name of a deceased rape victim which
was publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution of the crime.”).
148. See id. at 495–96 (explaining that the information contained in public
records has presumably been placed there for the public good and therefore its
dissemination neither harms the public nor constitutes an invasion of privacy).
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publicizing truthful facts. 149 The Court recognized the important
function that the press plays in a functioning democracy, and to
fully function in that role the press must be free to publicize
truthful newsworthy facts without fear of civil liability. 150 Because
of this important function of the press, this First Amendment
privilege would be entrenched in the common law as the
newsworthy exception.
In 1989 the Supreme Court again weighed in on a claim
against a publication for printing private facts. 151 This time, the
Court examined a negligence per se claim based on a misdemeanor
statute that criminalized the publication of the names of sexual
assault victims. 152 The case involved the publication of a rape
victim’s name from a police report that was in the police
department’s pressroom. 153 A reporter-trainee from The Florida
Star then transcribed the police report and passed it on to a
journalist, who then wrote a short news story on the crime and
included the victim’s name. 154 The named victim then brought a
negligence per se claim against the paper and was awarded
$100,000 in damages. 155 On appeal the Supreme Court ruled that
imposing civil penalties based on the facts of the case violated the
First Amendment. 156 In doing so the Supreme Court applied the
149. See id. at 489–90 (recognizing a privilege exists and applying it to a
publication of private facts tort claim).
150. See id. at 491–92 (stating that the press plays an important role in
providing oversight and disseminating information about the courts to the
public).
151. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 528–29 (1989) (explaining that
court was determining if damages awarded for publishing private facts were
appropriate).
152. See id. (discussing whether a local newspaper disclosing a rape victim’s
name after receiving if from the police constitutes as a misdemeanor).
153. See id. at 527 (explaining that the police report containing the victim’s
name was left in the pressroom and that the department put no restrictions on
who could enter the pressroom).
154. See id. (describing the chain of events that resulted in the publication of
the victim’s name).
155. See id. at 528–29 (explaining that the trial court denied defendant’s
motion for a directed verdict and allowed the jury to award $75,000 in
compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages).
156. See id. at 541 (holding that a statute cannot impose punishment on a
newspaper for publishing the legally obtained truthful facts unless the statute is
narrowly tailored to serve a state interest of the “highest order”).
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test from Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 157 which stated “[I]f a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a
state interest of the highest order.” 158 The Court stressed the fear
that imposing liability in cases such as this would lead to “timidity
and self-censorship” within the press itself. 159 The Court explained
that while protection of rape victims’ identity was a “highly
significant” interest, the means applied were not narrowly tailored
to effectuate their goal. 160 While the Court was examining a
negligence per se action based on a criminal statute here, it did
take the opportunity to discuss briefly some implications of the
publication of private facts tort. 161 The Court noted that the
negligence per se claim brought here had a very low threshold for
imposing civil sanctions. 162 This observation seemed to trouble the
Court, which stated “there [is no] scienter requirement of any kind
under § 794.03, engendering the perverse result that truthful
publications challenged pursuant to this cause of action are less
protected by the First Amendment than even the least protected
defamatory falsehoods.” 163 This disturbing observation could also
directly apply to the publication of private facts tort, where there
similarly is no scienter, actual malice, or bad faith requirement to
impose liability, making truthful speech less protected than
defamation. 164
157. See Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1979) (holding
narrowly that the asserted state interest could not justify the statute’s imposition
of criminal sanctions on the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile
delinquent’s name lawfully obtained by the newspaper).
158. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989).
159. See id. at 535–36 (explaining that a justification for Daily Mail’s test is
the potential chilling effect of the punishment of legally obtained truthful facts
would create).
160. See id. at 537 (indicating that the interest did not create a “need” to
impose liability and thereby infringe upon the First Amendment).
161. See id. at 539 (discussing the differences between this claim and one that
would be brought under publication of private facts).
162. See id. (explaining that under the negligence per se standard employed
by the lower courts, punishment was imposed simply for publishing the name
without any other requirements).
163. Id.
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (providing the definition
and elements of the publication of private facts tort).
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As the newsworthy exception became further cemented into
the common law, its definition would continue to evolve. In
Alabama, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
employed a nexus test to determine if the revealed private fact had
a valid connection with the public interest served by its
revelation. 165 The Fifth Circuit court heard a case based on the
publication of private details about the marriage between the
plaintiff and the author’s brother. 166 The court applied the fairly
recent decision by the Supreme Court and held that the disclosure
here was protected by the newsworthy exception. 167 In doing so the
appellate court gave some bounds to the qualification for the
newsworthiness privilege derived from the First Amendment,
stating:
[The] privilege is not merely limited to the dissemination of
news either in the sense of current events or commentary upon
public affairs. Rather, the privilege extends to information
concerning interesting phases of human activity and embraces
all issues about which information is needed or appropriate so
that individuals may cope with the exigencies of their period. 168

The Fifth Circuit provided a rather expansive view of the scope of
the privilege and its resulting newsworthy exception, explaining
that newsworthiness can apply to almost anything of public
interest. 169 The court explained that once that public interest
element has been recognized, a logical nexus between the
publicized facts and the matter of public interest must be
established to avoid liability. 170 The court quickly disposed of the
165. See Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980)
(explaining that a logical nexus existed between the facts complained and the
public interest that the book in question promoted).
166. See id. at 396–97 (describing the nature of the claim brought, which was
based on the publication of facts concerning the author’s brother and how he
influenced the religious and civil rights beliefs of the author).
167. See id. at 397 (discussing that a First Amendment privilege exists, that
it applies to the tort of invasion of privacy, and that it protects the speech in
question).
168. Id.
169. See id. (indicating that the privilege is adaptable and may be used to
combat intrusions on the First Amendment as they are encountered).
170. See id. (articulating that requiring a logical nexus protects the privacy of
those whose actions may be of public interest, but are not logically related to the
public interest promoted by the revelation of those details).
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nexus issue, explaining that the effects of the plaintiff’s
relationship with the author’s brother or the author were clearly
appropriate to be published in a book about the author’s life. 171
In 1969 the California Supreme Court again was presented
with an invasion of privacy by publication of true facts claim, this
time with a voluntary public figure in Kapellas v. Kofman. 172 The
plaintiff, a candidate for city council, brought a claim for invasion
of privacy against a newspaper after an article was published
featuring unflattering facts about her qualifications for city council
and her children. 173 The Supreme Court of California affirmed the
dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim because of how important
it was that the press disseminate of information about political
candidates. 174 In doing so, the court distinguished between
voluntary and involuntary public figures, stating:
In determining whether a particular incident is “newsworthy”
and thus whether the privilege shields its truthful publication
from liability, the courts consider a variety of factors, including
the social value of the facts published, the depth of the article’s
intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and the extent to which
the party voluntarily acceded to a position of public
notoriety . . . . [W]hen the legitimate public interest in the
published information is substantial, a much greater intrusion
into an individual’s private life will be sanctioned, especially if
the individual willingly entered into the public sphere. 175

Here we have an apparent divergence in standards for plaintiffs,
those that are voluntary public figures and those that are
involuntary. 176 This distinction is well within the tradition of torts
that potentially encroach on the First Amendment, where libel,
171. See id. (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that a logical nexus did not
exist between the publicized facts and the public interest served by their
publication).
172. See Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1969) (explaining that
the plaintiff, a politician running for office, had brought the claim for invasion of
privacy on behalf of both herself and her children).
173. See id. (indicating that the claim was brought as a result of facts stated
about both the plaintiff’s qualifications for city council and her children).
174. See id. at 924 (affirming the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim
because of the categorical importance of the information conveyed).
175. Id. at 922.
176. See id. (indicating that the court would allow greater intrusions into the
privacy of voluntary public figures).
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slander, and defamation law all hold similar standards. 177 As we
will see in the next case, involuntary public figures have a similar
difficulties in claims for invasion of privacy claim as the
newsworthiness exception has been read very broadly to
encompass almost any publication of facts the public would find
interesting.
In 1984, the California Court of Appeals applied the
newsworthy exception to a case involving an involuntary public
figure. 178 That court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts
definition for an involuntary public figure and their corresponding
privacy rights. 179 The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines an
involuntary public figure as:
There are other individuals who have not sought publicity or
consented to it, but through their own conduct or otherwise
have become a legitimate subject of public interest. They have,
in other words, become ‘news.’ Those who commit crime or are
accused of it may not only not seek publicity but may make
every possible effort to avoid it, but they are nevertheless
persons of public interest, concerning whom the public is
entitled to be informed. The same is true as to those who are the
victims of crime or are so unfortunate as to be present when it
is committed, as well as those who are the victims of
catastrophes or accidents or are involved in judicial proceedings
or other events that attract public attention. These persons are
regarded as properly subject to the public interest, and
publishers are permitted to satisfy the curiosity of the public as
to its heroes, leaders, villains and victims, and those who are
closely associated with them. As in the case of the voluntary
public figure, the authorized publicity is not limited to the event
that itself arouses the public interest, and to some reasonable
extent includes publicity given to facts about the individual that
would otherwise be purely private. 180

177. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964) (distinguishing
between the remedies of a public official and a private person in a civil libel
action); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1988)
(differentiating between the pleading standard required for a public figure and a
private figure in an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
178. See Sipple v. Chron. Pub. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(explaining the involuntary nature of the plaintiff’s status as a public figure).
179. See id. (discussing that the court is employing the definition from the
Restatement to determine if the plaintiff is now a voluntary public figure).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f.
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In Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Company, 181 the California Court
of Appeals heard a claim from a gay man who had helped avert an
assassination attempt on President Gerald Ford in 1975. 182 An
article was then written about Oliver W. Sipple (Sipple) that
revealed his sexual orientation and he brought this claim following
its publication. 183 The court ruled that no invasion of privacy had
occurred because knowledge of Sipple’s sexual orientation was
known by several hundred people. 184 The court went on to suggest
that even if his sexual orientation had been a closely-guarded
secret, his claim would have still failed because the information
was newsworthy. 185 The court explained that the motivation for
the publication of the document can be helpful to the
determination of whether the newsworthy exception applies. 186
The court again quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving
of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake,
with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent
standards, would say that he had no concern. 187

As one can see, the contours and boundaries of the newsworthy
exception have begun to be drawn. Not only is the newsworthy
value of the news being used as a factor, but also the motivation
that surrounds the release of that information. The information
181. See Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 671 (affirming summary judgment because
the “trial court could determine as a matter of law that the facts contained in the
articles were not private facts within the purview of the law and also that the
publications relative to the appellant were newsworthy”).
182. See id. at 666 (explaining the facts of the case, that Sipple pushed the
arm of Ford’s would be assassin as she raised and shot a gun at the President).
183. See id. at 670 n.2 (indicating that the article revealed that Sipple was
gay, with the hope that perhaps this revelation would help break traditional
homosexual stereotypes).
184. See id. (discussing that the large number of individuals in multiple cities
with knowledge of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation precluded a suit because the
facts were not private).
185. See id. at 669 (articulating that even if the plaintiff’s sexual orientation
was not known by the public the publication of the fact would have been protected
by the newsworthy exception).
186. See id. at 668 (explaining that because the publications motives were not
in bad faith and the information was newsworthy, the plaintiff’s claim was not
valid).
187. Id. at 670 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h.
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alone, being of interest to the general public, is not the only factor
to be considered, but also whether the release of the private
information directly serves the public interest purpose proffered
for its dissemination.
When Delaware first encountered a claim for invasion of
privacy due to publication of private facts in 1963, it reached a
familiar result. 188 This case concerned an article written following
a state senator’s proposed bill reinstating whipping as a
punishment for certain crimes. 189 The article mentioned that the
last time that punishment was administered was eleven years
earlier to a John Barbieri for breaking and entering. 190 The
Delaware court employed a similar reasoning to that in Sipple,
explaining that one who has become a public figure has lost certain
privacy rights. 191 The court aptly stated “One who seeks the public
eye cannot complain of publicity if the publication does not violate
ordinary notions of decency.” 192 Because Senator Barbieri had been
thrust into the public eye due to his criminal conviction, he was a
public figure for the purposes of his claim. 193
The Supreme Court of Kansas used similar reasoning when it
examined a claim that a newspaper publishing alleged private
facts in 1975. 194 In the case, a former police officer’s dismissal was
publicized in a paper’s column that focused on events that took
place ten years earlier to the day in the town. 195 The Kansas court
188. See Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963) (stating that
this is the first time an invasion of privacy claim of this type has been brought in
Delaware).
189. See id. at 773–74 (discussing that the article was written following and
in response to a state senator’s proposal to reinstate whipping as a punishment).
190. See id. (describing that in the course of the article, Barbieri was
mentioned because he was the last recorded person officially punished by
whipping in Delaware).
191. See id. at 774–75 (indicating that the actions of public figures are of
public interest and should be able to be reported upon).
192. Id. at 774.
193. See id. at 774–75 (explaining that like other types of public figures,
criminals were public figures for the purposes of their trial and punishment); but
see Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 168–69 (1979) (holding
that a contempt citation did not make a plaintiff a public figure when bringing a
libel claim).
194. See Rawlins v. Hutchinson Pub. Co., 543 P.2d 988, 989 (Kan. 1975)
(explaining that this is a publication of private facts claim against a newspaper).
195. See id. at 989–90 (explaining the nature of the article that publicized the
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ruled that because of his status as a police officer, he was a public
official and, as a result, his actions were of public interest. 196 As
the Kansas court stated “[a] person who by his accomplishments,
fame, or mode of life, or by adopting a profession or calling which
gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, or
character, is said to become a public personage, and thereby
relinquishes a part of his right of privacy.” 197 Much like the earlier
courts discussed, it is clear the Kansas court intends to create a
separate standard for invasions of privacy for purely private
individuals versus public figures and officials. As we will see, this
distinction has very real consequences for plaintiffs, with the fate
of their claim based largely on their status.
So far, these cases have concerned specific newsworthy events
or actions. In 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit encountered a case where facts tangentially related
to a newsworthy event were published and the subject of the story
brought a claim for publication of private facts. 198 The case
concerned an article written about an anesthesiologist who was the
subject of two malpractice suits. 199 The article sought to highlight
the issue presented by improper medical policing that could result
in severe injury or death. 200 The plaintiff alleged that the article
violated her privacy rights by discussing her history of “psychiatric
and related personal problems,” arguing that her problems
themselves were not newsworthy. 201 The Tenth Circuit concluded
that the reported private facts were newsworthy because there an

unflattering facts about the officer’s dismissal ten years earlier).
196. See id. at 993 (indicating that both public figures and public officials give
up certain privacy rights that would be afforded to other citizens).
197. Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Cohen v. Marx, 211 P.2d 320,
321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949)).
198. See Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981)
(explaining the premise of a plaintiff’s argument that the information printed,
while related to her, had no relation to the newsworthy event that was being
covered).
199. See id. at 306 (specifying that both episodes of malpractice resulted in
either death or extreme disability to the patient).
200. See id. at 306–07 (describing the article’s motivation for highlighting an
issue within the professional community of doctors).
201. See id. (indicating that the “problems” were included in the story as an
explanation for the plaintiff’s erratic and tortious behavior).
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editor could draw a “rational inference” between the facts and the
newsworthy event. 202 The court reasons:
[T]hat a rule forbidding editors from drawing inferences from
truthful newsworthy facts would result in a far too restrictive
and wholly unjustifiable construction of the first amendment
privilege. If the press is to have the generous breathing space
that courts have accorded it thus far, editors must have freedom
to make reasonable judgments and to draw one inference where
others also reasonably could be drawn. This is precisely the
editorial discretion contemplated by the privilege. 203

If a reasonable editor could draw an inference between the private
fact and the newsworthy event, then the publication would face no
liability. 204 The reasonable editor standard for finding inferences
should have protected Gawker from liability because a reasonable
inference can be drawn between the sex tape and the newsworthy
topic of Bollea’s reputation as a role model for children. The
adultery serves to directly oppose the supposition that Bollea was
fit to be a role model and therefore it is newsworthy.
In the early 1990s the magniloquent Judge Posner and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit weighed in
on an invasion of privacy claim brought over the tangential subject
of a book. 205 The case involved both a libel and an invasion of
privacy claim, both based on the contents of a book depicting the
African-American transition that occurred during the Great
Migration. 206 The book attempted to encapsulate the unique
African-American experience that was present during the Great
Migration. 207 The author, Nicholas Lemann, attempted to do this
202. See id. at 308–09 (explaining that because an editor could infer that these
private facts were related to the newsworthy event, a recovery was barred).
203. Id. at 309.
204. See id. (concluding that editorial discretion requires a reasonable editor
to make inferences between private facts and newsworthy events that others
potentially would not).
205. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1224 (7th Cir. 1993)
(explaining the nature of the claims and that they followed from publication of a
book featuring the plaintiff and his wife).
206. See id. (stating that the plaintiff sought relief for both libelous
statements made in the book about him and for an invasion of his privacy by
publicizing unflattering facts about him).
207. See id. (discussing that the Great Migration was a movement of five
million African-Americans between 1940 and 1970 from rural areas in the South
to more urban areas in the North).
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by following of the story of several individuals whose experience
was representative of the many. 208 These details were important
because they formed the basis of Judge Posner’s reasoning for the
required nexus between the private facts and the social interest
served by their publication. 209 Judge Posner’s analysis began with
a reading of the earlier precedent, leading him to draw the
conclusion that “[t]he Court must believe that the First
Amendment greatly circumscribes the right even of a private
figure to obtain damages for the publication of newsworthy facts
about him, even when they are facts of a kind that people want
very much to conceal.” 210 Posner recognized and read the tort to be
valid only if “the private facts publicized be such as would make a
reasonable person deeply offended by such publicity but also that
they be facts in which the public has no legitimate interest.” 211
Posner then applied his reasoning of the tort to the case and found
that there is a connection between the private facts and the public
interest served. 212 The facts are inseparable from the book if it is
to perform the vital social function for which it was written: inform
readers about The Great Migration. 213
This interpretation implies a rather liberal nexus test, that
the private facts publicized only need to have a tangential, albeit
necessary, relation to public interest served. But Posner left us
with a caveat that proves somewhat fortuitous “[p]hotographic
invasions of privacy usually are more painful than narrative ones,
and even partial nudity is a considerable aggravating factor.” 214
208. See id. (discussing the journalistic method that Lemann used in his
narrative, attempting to tell the story of the whole by telling the story of
representative individuals).
209. See id. at 1233 (reasoning that because the events of the lives represent
the subject matter of the book, it was necessary for the author to include the
accounts, lest his work of journalism become one of fiction, frustrating the societal
benefit of his work in the first place).
210. Id. at 1232.
211. Id.
212. See id. (explaining that the methodology used for writing the book, that
of individual case studies, required that the author publish the stories about its
subject).
213. See id. (indicating that because specific facts were necessary to the
publication of the book, the publication served to establish a connection to public
interest).
214. Id. at 1234.
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Posner indicated that the medium of the publication makes a
difference in the balancing of public interest and the private
interest. 215 The medium of publication of many of these private
facts changed to that of the new media over several years following
Haynes. 216 However, the results for plaintiffs and the
corresponding freedoms enjoyed by the press to publicize truthful
facts would not change.
B. A Shift from Old Media to New and Its Effect on the Tort
So far, the invasions of privacy claims examined have
primarily taken the form of the written word. The statements the
plaintiffs complained of were found in newspapers or other written
publications. 217 As the primary mode of media shifted over the late
twentieth century, 218 so did the medium that transmitted many of
these complained invasions of privacy. 219 Media transitioned from
the written word to broadcast video, and a whole new line of issues
and, eventually, cases evolved with it. Still, the precedent
remained familiar, and the courts still set an incredibly high bar
for plaintiffs seeking to recover from the media for publication of
private facts.
The new media reared its ugly head in the publication of
private facts realm repeatedly during the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries. In 1998, the Supreme Court of California

215. See id. at 1224 (explaining that photographic intrusions are more painful
than others and therefore through extrapolation one can assume that private
facts published in the form other than the written word may have different
balancing weights associated with the factors).
216. See Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 473 (Cal. 1998)
(acknowledging that the shift from print media to electronic media has become
substantial).
217. See generally Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
218. See GEOFFREY COLON, DISRUPTIVE MARKETING: WHAT GROWTH HACKERS,
DATA PUNKS AND OTHER HYBRID THINKERS CAN TEACH US ABOUT NAVIGATING THE
NEW NORMAL 239 (2016) (“It wasn’t until the early 20th century that we had our
senses of sound a sight awoken by radio, television, and the birth of broadcast
media. This new media shift had an easy-to-understand dynamic.”).
219. See supra Section B (explaining that this author observed the cases that
began to emerge in the 1990s tended to be from the publication of private facts
over video media rather than print media).
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again approached the publication of private facts question. 220 The
court was keenly aware of the shift in media coverage and the
effects the shift may have on the tort. 221 The change in the primary
medium of media could potentially create even more offensive
invasions into one’s private life. However, squaring that risk with
the fundamental right of the press to report on truthful facts
became an even more difficult balancing act than that in which the
courts had been previously engaged. 222 The Supreme Court of
California eloquently stated the difficulty here:
At what point does the publishing or broadcasting of otherwise
private words, expressions and emotions cease to be protected
by the press’s constitutional and common law privilege—its
right to report on matters of legitimate public interest—and
become an unjustified, actionable invasion of the subject’s
private life? How can the courts fashion and administer
meaningful
rules
for
protecting
privacy
without
unconstitutionally setting themselves up as censors or editors?
Publication or broadcast aside, do reporters, in their effort to
gather the news, have any special privilege to intrude,
physically or with sophisticated photographic and recording
equipment, into places and conversations that would otherwise
be private? Questions of this nature have concerned courts and
commentators at least since Brandeis and Warren wrote their
seminal article, and continue to do so to this day. 223

Therein lies the difficulty the courts have with this issue.
Individuals value privacy greatly, but a well-functioning
democracy requires freedom of the press to report on factual,
newsworthy events. 224 The facts the Supreme Court of California
considered are enough to make anyone sympathetic to the plight
220. See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 473 (discussing the nature of invasion of
privacy claims brought for a publication of private facts).
221. See id. (expressing that the problems associated with defining a right of
privacy have not changed, even though the medium has, and that the new
medium may bring new problems that were not clear or developed during the
written word period of the tort).
222. See id. (indicating that the balancing of privacy rights and the freedom
of the press to report truthful, newsworthy facts created a very difficult balancing
act for the courts to employ).
223. Id. at 473–74.
224. See id. (specifying the difficult position courts found themselves in
regarding the balancing of privacy rights of individuals with the press’s right to
report on truthful matters of public interest).
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of those whose privacy is limited by their involvement in an event
of public interest. The plaintiff, Ruth Shulman (Shulman), was
involved in a terrible car accident. 225 After the accident, a medical
helicopter containing a camera man employed by the defendants
was dispatched to provide medical care and transport Shulman to
the hospital. 226 Shulman’s ordeal was filmed and then broadcast
several months later. 227 Shulman then brought a claim for invasion
of privacy due to publication of the video. 228 The court, in
recognizing the difficult balancing act they were required to
perform, read the tort to require that the published information
not be newsworthy. 229 Also, the court recognized that
“newsworthiness is at the same time a constitutional defense to, or
privilege against, liability for publication of truthful
information.” 230 Then the court analyzed what constituted a
matter of public interest based on precedent. 231 The court made a
“normative assessment” of the “social value” of the content while
factoring in both the “degree of intrusion” into the plaintiff’s
privacy and the plaintiff’s own contribution to being a part of the
public event. 232 The court concluded that “recent decisions have
generally tested newsworthiness with regard to such individuals
by assessing the logical relationship or nexus, or the lack thereof,
between the events or activities that brought the person into the
public eye and the particular facts disclosed.” 233 A nexus test is
necessary to determine if the newsworthy event is logically related
225. See id. at 475 (describing how the plaintiff’s car was found in a ditch and
that the jaws of life were employed to extract the occupants of the car).
226. See id. (explaining that the within the helicopter was a cameraman and
nurse who had was wearing a microphone).
227. See id. at 474–76 (stating that the events following the accident were
broadcast in a show entitled “On Scene: Emergency Response” shortly after the
accident).
228. See id. at 476 (articulating how the plaintiffs brought claims against the
producers of the show for invasion of privacy).
229. See id. at 478–79 (discussing that earlier precedent in California had
recognized lack of newsworthiness as an element of the prima facie case for
invasion of privacy by publication of private facts).
230. Id. at 479.
231. See id. at 479–84 (listing the different effects on precedent of the tort
over the years to help define what qualifies as newsworthy).
232. See id. (stating the balancing test the courts must employ to determine
whether the facts at issue are newsworthy).
233. Id. at 484–85.
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to the facts disclosed. 234 Requiring a nexus draws “a protective line
at the point the material revealed ceases to have any substantial
connection to the subject matter of the newsworthy report.” 235 The
court cautioned that great deference must be given to the press,
that it is not the job of the courts or juries to determine what is fit
to publish, and that the standard for newsworthiness is whether
“some reasonable members of the community could entertain a
legitimate interest in it.” 236 The court restrained its balancing of
interests to the newsworthiness element. 237 After its analysis, the
court determined that the events Shulman experienced were of
public interest and her claim was precluded by that status. 238 The
court concluded with warnings over the potential First
Amendment issues brought forth by cases such as these, stating:
That analytical path is dictated by the danger of the contrary
approach; to allow liability because this court, or a jury, believes
certain details of the story as broadcast were not important or
necessary to the purpose of the documentary, or were in poor
taste or overly sensational in impact, would be to assert
impermissible supervisory power over the press . . . . In short,
the state may not intrude into the proper sphere of the news
media to dictate what they should publish and broadcast, but
neither may the media play tyrant to the people by unlawfully
spying on them in the name of newsgathering. 239

These are reoccurring themes present throughout a study of the
precedent: the balancing of the First Amendment interest and the
individual right to privacy. As more media moved to video and
away from the written word, more cases of this ilk were presented
to courts around the country with similar results.
Later in 1998, the Central District of California was presented
with a case very similar to Bollea v. Gawker, in Michael v. Internet
234. See id. at 484 (discussing that a “logical nexus” is required for the
newsworthiness exception to apply).
235. Id.
236. See id. at 485–86 (describing the difficulties in applying newsworthy
standard due to differing opinions between individuals about what constitutes as
general public interest).
237. See id. at 487 (explaining that, in order to determine if certain facts
published are newsworthy, a balancing of interests must be employed).
238. See id. (articulating that the court agrees that the events broadcasted
were of a legitimate public interest and therefore the suit fails).
239. Id. at 497–98.
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Entertainment Group, Inc. 240 Celebrities Bret Michaels and
Pamela Anderson Lee had made a sex tape together that was
acquired by Internet Entertainment Group (IEG) who planned to
sell it on the internet. 241 This announcement by IEG created
intense media attention and speculation because of the status of
the celebrities, and because Pamela Anderson had been involved
in a similar dispute some years earlier. 242 At this point the court
was determining whether to grant summary judgment to the
secondary defendant Paramount, the producers of the show “Hard
Copy.” 243 Paramount had broadcast several short segments of the
sex tape, each lasting between two and five seconds, in an episode
of Hard Copy. 244 The court ruled that the facts at issue in this case
were private, but the claim was barred by the newsworthiness
privilege. 245 It justified its summary judgment by determining that
“in cases balancing First Amendment against state law right to
privacy, federal courts should resolve doubtful cases at summary
judgment to prevent freedom of the press from being restricted ‘at
the sufferance of juries.’” 246 The court ruled that the newsworthy
privilege applied because Anderson was a voluntary public figure
and the “private matters bore a substantial nexus to a matter of
public interest.” 247 Because of Anderson’s status as a voluntary
public figure, the court questioned whether the nexus was
240. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., No. CV 98–0583 DDP (CWx),
1998 WL 882848, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1998) (granting summary judgment
for defendants in a publication of private facts because showing short clips of a
celebrity sex tape constituted newsworthy content).
241. See id. (stating that the sex tape had been made and then, through
circumstances not entirely known, acquired by IEG who planned to market and
sell the video through their websites).
242. See id. at *8 (indicating that the case had brought media attention, and
briefly discussing Pamela Anderson’s similar sex-tape litigation from the
preceding year).
243. See id. at *1 (stating that the court was considering a summary judgment
motion for the alleged invasion of privacy committed by Paramount, not the
invasion of privacy committed by Internet Entertainment Group).
244. See id. (discussing that portions of the video were broadcast on Hard
Copy, and that each one of those portions was between two and five seconds).
245. See id. at *9 (concluding that although the facts were considered private,
the newsworthiness privilege applied and that summary judgment was
appropriate).
246. Id.
247. Id. at *10.

HOGAN V.GAWKER: A LEG DROP

251

required. 248 The court ultimately felt that the nexus would be
satisfied even if unnecessary. 249 The court balanced the intrusion
with the public interest, noting that courts must give great
deference to the public interest in these matters. 250 The court then
ruled that the tort will fail as a matter of law, and granted
Paramount summary judgment on the invasion of privacy claim. 251
Pamela Anderson was in the California courtrooms one year
prior to the Michaels litigation, bringing an invasion of privacy
claim against the publishers of “Penthouse Magazine” for
publishing intimate pictures of both her and her now ex-husband,
Tommy Lee. 252 In granting the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, the United States Court for the Central District of
California made two key observations. First, the court stated that
the “intimate nature of the photographs and the degree to which
their publication intruded upon the privacy of Plaintiffs is simply
not relevant for determining newsworthiness.” 253 The court
essentially determined that the offensive nature of a picture or
video published did not detract from its newsworthiness. The
second key observation was that if a photo has already been
published, it no longer qualifies as a private fact for the purposes
of an invasion of privacy suit. 254 The court concluded that once the
first actor has broken the seal of privacy by releasing a photo,
actors who later release the photo are not liable for invading the
privacy of the subject of those photos. These two points made by
248. See id. at *9 (“Because Lee is a voluntary public figure, it is not clear
whether the Shulman requirement of a substantial nexus between the matters
published and reasons for her notoriety is necessary.”).
249. See id. at *10 (discussing that the court was not sure whether to require
the nexus to show if matter is newsworthy in the case of voluntary public figures,
but if it was found necessary, that the element would be satisfied by the facts of
this case).
250. See id. (explaining that even once newsworthiness is established, a
balancing of the public and private interest is still necessary).
251. See id. (concluding that summary judgment was appropriate because the
newsworthiness privilege applied).
252. See Lee v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., No. CV96–7069SVW (JGX), 1997 WL
33384309, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 1997) (dissecting the nature of the claim, that
the photos published were of an “intimate” nature, and were featured in an article
describing Anderson’s life and marriage to Tommy Lee).
253. Id. at *5.
254. See id. at *6 (describing that once a photo has been published, it is now
in the public realm and no longer considered a private fact).
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the court in this matter are essential to the analysis of the Bollea
decision, and both serve to invalidate the claim against Gawker.
California is not the only state to encounter a claim brought
for invasion of privacy through the broadcast of images. In 1997, a
man whose arrest was filmed and broadcasted on the television
show “COPS” brought a claim in Ohio against Fox Television
Network. 255 The United States Court for the Northern District of
Ohio granted summary judgment to the defendants, determining
that the facts broadcasts were newsworthy because they related to
matter of legitimate public concern. 256
The common theme throughout these cases is the protection of
journalists’ rights to print legally obtained factual information
without facing civil liability. Once the potential for civil liability
enters the editor’s mental calculus, their editorial discretion has
been chilled in a way completely incompatible with our conception
of First Amendment rights. 257 The right to print truthful facts
relating to a newsworthy topic is essential to maintain the delicate
market place of ideas that our country relies upon. This is
especially true when those facts relate to a newsworthy event
involving a public figure or official. The press plays a special role
in providing oversight for the public, requiring that public figures
and officials, who have benefitted so much from the public itself,
be held to the same standard in their private lives as they claim to
hold themselves to in their public lives.
V. Application of Precedent to Bollea v. Gawker
After looking at the history of publication of private facts
cases, it is clear that precedent would point towards no liability for
Gawker for two primary reasons: Bollea is a public figure and the
publication of the tape is related to a newsworthy issue. These two
factors are invariably intertwined.
255. See Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 703, 707 (N.D. Ohio
1997) (explaining the background of the case, that the claim arises from a filmed
arrest following a physical altercation).
256. See id. at 709 (stating the claim fails because the arrest of individuals is
a matter of public interest).
257. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974)
(discussing that penalties for printing controversial material may result in editors
avoiding printing controversial material completely).
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Gawker should have faced no liability because the tape at
issue related to a newsworthy event. Bollea is a public figure
because of his celebrity. 258 He has been personally enriched
because of this celebrity, and much of that celebrity is based on the
public perception that he is the All-American hero he was
portrayed to be in wrestling. 259 Bollea’s image as Hulk Hogan was
so entrenched in popular culture that even after a long “heel run”
the fans cheered and longed for the hero Hogan character to
return. 260 One such example of this occurred in Toronto at
WrestleMania 18. 261 Bollea had recently returned to the WWE,
playing the dastardly heel character “Hollywood” Hulk Hogan. 262
He was programmed with Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson, a babyface
who was arguably the most popular wrestler at the time. 263 In
order to set up the match, and portray Bollea in the most negative
light possible, Bollea repeatedly attacked Johnson along with his
gang and even spray painted Bollea’s group logo on his back. 264
Following these events, the natural reaction of most audiences
would be to “boo” Bollea. When Bollea made his entrance, the
arena erupted—it was clear that plans had to changed. 265 The fans
simply refused to treat Bollea as a heel; he simply meant that
258. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2014) (explaining that it was undisputed that Terry Bollea was a public
figure).
259. See Madigan, supra note 15 (“Describing the former wrestler as ‘a real
American hero’ and, when he was younger, ‘the ultimate object of desire.’”).
260. See Episode 30: The NWO in WWE, SOMETHING TO WRESTLE WITH BRUCE
PRICHARD (Feb. 3, 2017) (downloaded through iTunes) (describing that Bollea had
been portrayed as a heel since he joined the NWO in 1996).
261. See id. (indicating that WrestleMania 18 was Bollea’s first WrestleMania
appearance since 1993).
262. See id. (stating that when Bollea rejoined the WWE he was portraying
the Hollywood Hogan character that he had developed while in the faction
“NWO”).
263. See id. (specifying that Johnson may have been the most popular
wrestler in the world).
264. See id. (describing that in order to ensure that fans would boo Bollea,
Bollea and his two “NWO” companions—Scott Hall and Kevin Nash—would
repeatedly attempt to injure Johnson in the weeks leading up to the match,
including by ramming a semi-truck into an ambulance purportedly carrying an
injured Johnson).
265. See id. (explaining that fans, despite the company’s best efforts, still
viewed Bollea as a hero).
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much to the audience. 266 Bollea’s good guy image was so engrained
in popular and wrestling culture that audiences would simply not
accept him as a villain. 267 Therefore, it would be reasonable that
any information directly refuting the purported good guy image of
Bollea would be newsworthy.
Given Bollea’s reputation as a role model for children,
information directly proving his engagement in adultery would
serve to disprove this reputation, or at least to couch it in realistic
terms. It is important that society view its role models realistically.
Knowing whether our role models’ private actions comport with
their public images serves as a societal check. Society deserves to
know if public figures are the people they say are. Because the tape
went to directly disprove, or at least throw doubt on whether Bollea
was the man he publically purported to be, it is newsworthy.
Hogan was not forced to become a role model. He voluntarily took
on the moniker and has received countless benefits from it. 268
Because of this the public has a right to know if his character is
worthy of the illustrious position he has been raised to in the public
eye.
The tape itself is also newsworthy. Much like in Michaels, the
public was aware that this tape existed and considerable curiosity
had developed around it. 269 That public interest in the tape, about
its existence and content, in and of itself makes it newsworthy. 270

266. See id. (indicating that because of the great nostalgia many fans hold
towards Bollea it was impossible for the fans to boo him).
267. See id. (stating that many fans still looked at Bollea as their idol).
268. See Nick Schwartz, WCW Salaries Between 1996 and 2000 Revealed,
with Hulk Hogan and Dennis Rodman Big Winners, FOX SPORTS (June 7, 2016,
6:46 PM), https://www.foxsports.com.au/what-the-fox/wcw-salaries-between1996-and-2000-revealed-with-hulk-hogan-and-dennis-rodman-big-winners/news-story/
cc0dd40421817640c1399f47a2224b89 (explaining that while working for WCW
Bollea’s salary was $5 million greater than the next highest salary) (on file with
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
269. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2014) (indicating that numerous publications had already reported the
existence of the video, generating public interest and curiosity about its
existence).
270. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., No. CV 98–0583 DDP (CWx),
1998 WL 882848, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1998) (explaining that public interest
in the existence of the tape and its creation were sufficient to make the event
newsworthy).
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Public knowledge of the tape creates widespread curiosity. 271
When that curiosity is then reasonably related to a matter of a
public concern to the extent that a reasonable editor could draw an
inference that the private fact related to the public concern, both a
nexus and newsworthiness is established. 272 In our current case,
that newsworthy event linked to the private facts could either be
its refutation of Bollea’s status as a role model, or the release of
the video itself. 273 A reasonable editor could draw an inference
from the tape to either of those two subjects, both being
newsworthy and capable of preventing liability.
VI. Recommendations
To combat the problems that juries present with these
sensitive matters, I recommend that the court apply a similar
summary judgment standard for invasion of privacy by publication
of private facts to that laid out by Judge Dean Pregerson in
Michaels. 274 If the plaintiff can establish that the facts reported
were not newsworthy, then the summary judgment should not be
granted. 275 When that is not established, it is appropriate to grant
summary judgment to the defendant. 276 In order to protect
defendants from sensitive juries, unable to separate themselves
from these public events, it would be appropriate in my estimation
to require that the facts in contest be shown to be non-newsworthy
before allowing the trial to continue. The question of
newsworthiness is a factual determination, but one that is too
271. See id. (indicating that uncertainty surrounding the existence or release
of a tape of this kind creates public interest and a newsworthy story).
272. See Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308–09 (10th Cir. 1981)
(describing that a publication cannot be held liable for revealing legally obtained
private facts that a reasonable editor could draw in inference from relating it to
the newsworthy event).
273. See Michaels, 1998 WL 882848, at *10 (discussing the curiosity
surrounding the tape’s release created a newsworthy event).
274. See id. (indicating that once a substantial nexus is established to a
newsworthy event, the claim is precluded as a matter of law and extinguished at
the summary judgment stage).
275. See id. at *7 (explaining that the burden to show that the facts are not
newsworthy is on the plaintiff).
276. See id. (stating that a claim that is able to establish that the facts
reported are not newsworthy would survive summary judgment).
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sensitive to expect of juries. Judges should be the arbiters of that
determination, and bright lines should be drawn to determine as a
matter of law whether facts are newsworthy or not. The First
Amendment demands a highly deferential test for newsworthiness
when the case involves a public figure or official.
An appropriate test could be borrowed from Gilbert v. Medical
Economics Company, 277 essentially allowing for a newsworthy
designation to be applied to facts pertaining to a public figure or
official that any reasonable editor would find newsworthy. 278 While
one could argue that judges should not be making this
determination, I would argue they are far more qualified than
juries. Judges would be far less likely to react viscerally to the
sometimes-squeamish facts. They are better equipped to
distinguish between the privacy rights of public and private actors.
Juries are too likely to put themselves in the shoes of the public
figure or official, while judges are trained to apply the law in a far
more clinical and antiseptic manner. This suggestion is not a novel
approach. As the Gilbert court quoted in support of its summary
judgment finding:
When civil cases may have a chilling effect on First Amendment
rights, special care is appropriate. Thus, a judicial examination
at these states of the proceeding, closely scrutinizing the
evidence to determine whether the case should be terminated
in a defendant’s favor, provides a buffer against possible First
Amendment interferences. 279

In this way, the courts could ensure a more standardized result,
combating the chilling effect this tort can have, and hopefully
avoiding results like Gawker in the future.
Another way to prevent this tort from chilling protected speech
would be to preclude public figures and officials from bringing
claims without a showing of actual malice. To justify this position,

277. See Gilbert, 665 F.2d at 309 (affirming summary judgment because
“under these circumstances the public has a very strong and immediate
legitimate interest, and the first amendment protects the media's right to reveal
this information”).
278. See id. (describing that claims which infringe upon First Amendment
must be carefully vetted as to not violate the Constitution).
279. Id. (quoting Guam Fed’n of Teachers, Local 1581, of Am. Fed’n of
Teachers v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1974)).

HOGAN V.GAWKER: A LEG DROP

257

we borrow the framework The Florida Star v. B.J.F. 280 borrowed
from Daily Mail to determine whether a statute the creates civil
penalties for speech violates the First Amendment. 281 That test
prevents imposing civil liability when a publication prints lawfully
obtained, truthful facts unless the statute is narrowly tailored to
promote a state interest of the highest order. 282 While examining a
civil tort claim, a clear analogy can be drawn between both
circumstances because both use civil penalties to punish truthful
speech. 283 One can argue that the same poison that defeated
B.J.F.’s claim is inherent in the publication of a private facts tort
itself: its means are not narrowly tailored to achieve a state
interest of the highest order. Both B.J.F.’s claim and the tort lack
any scienter or actual malice requirement, leading to the same
“perverse” outcome that the Florida Star court discussed. 284
Because of the similarities these two claims possess, (B.J.F.’s
negligence per se claim and the publication of private facts tort
claim) and because of the untenable result that both claims reach
in their current form, a similar reasoning should be applied to
both. When one applies the reasoning from Florida Star, the result
is fairly clear. Gawker legally obtained the information. 285 The
matter was newsworthy because it pertained to a public figure and
was reasonably related to a matter of public concern. 286
Finally, the means used to punish this speech was civil
penalties. 287 Under the same standard that the court employed in
280. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that a
statute cannot impose punishment on a newspaper for publishing the legally
obtained truthful facts unless the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a state
interest of the “highest order”).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See id. (explaining that this test is appropriate for examining statutes
that create civil penalties for truthful speech).
284. See id. at 539 (discussing that B.J.F.’s claim would impose liability for
publishing truth at a less strict standard than libel law).
285. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2014) (explaining that Bollea has never contended that Gawker illegally
obtained the tape).
286. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., No. CV 98-0583 DDP (CWx), 1998
WL 882848, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1998) (indicating that public curiosity
surrounding the potential release of a sex tape of a celebrity constituted a
newsworthy event).
287. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 529 (1989) (stating that civil
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Florida Star it appears that the tort itself violates the First
Amendment. To cure the tort of its deficiency, it would be prudent
to narrow the tort by requiring a showing of actual malice when
the claim is brought by public figures or officials. The requirement
could help better protect publications against these claims,
ferreting out and immunizing those stories that have been
published to further a public interest while still punishing
malicious publication of private facts that serve no legitimate
public purpose. Furthermore, it would bring the publication of
private facts tort more in line with other speech-based tort claims
brought by public figures or officials. 288 Several state supreme
courts have already questioned the constitutionality of the tort and
expressed doubts. 289 It would be prudent for other state supreme
courts to examine the tort to determine if it is in line with state
constitutions.
VII. Conclusion
While the problems the tort of publication of private facts
present can seem complicated, when boiled down to it, the policy
implications are quite clear: whether it accords with our
interpretations of the First Amendment to allow a publication to
be sued into non-existence for publishing lawfully obtained
truthful facts. When question is broken down into small parts, the
answer is apparent. This supposition cannot possibly comport with
public policy, our nation’s interest in the free exchange of ideas, or
the First Amendment. Something clearly needs to be done to bring
this tort into line with constitutional jurisprudence. The next time
damages were awarded to the plaintiff).
288. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (illustrating
that, to prevail on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, a public
figure must show “actual malice”).
289. See Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Companies, Inc., 712 P.2d 803, 805 (Or.
1986) (explaining the potential constitutional issues that the tort presents but not
ruling on those issues because they could vacate the damages under different
grounds); see also Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 691 (Ind. 1997)
(stating that the “Indiana Constitution commands real caution about proposals
to recognize a civil cause of action for libel that impose liability for truthful
statements”).
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this issue arises, we may be defending the New York Times’ or the
Washington Post’s right to print potentially embarrassing truthful
facts about public figures and officials.
Given the current climate in the executive branch, with their
adversarial approach to the media, it has never seemed more
necessary to extend additional protections to our media. By
changing the summary judgment standard, or by disallowing the
tort to be brought by public figures or officials without a showing
of actual malice, we could take one small step in making sure that
the miscarriage of justice that occurred in Florida will never
happen again.

